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Abstract
This paper introduces the notion of protective strategy combina-
tion in the context of nite games in strategic form. It shows that for
matrix games the set of protective strategy combinations equals the
set of proper equilibria. Moreover, in the context of bimatrix games,
the notion of protective behaviour is used as a selection tool.
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1 Introduction
The notion of protective behaviour was rst introduced in [1] in the con-
text of implementation of social choice functions for social choice situations
with a nite number of alternatives. Here, an agent behaves in a protec-
tive way if he reveals his preferences so as to protect himself from the worst
eventuality as far as possible. This concept is closely related to the notion of
prudent behaviour as [11] formulated. The main dierence is that the latter
assumes that each agent considers all possible preference proles of other
agents equally likely, whereas the former does not.
Protective behaviour as a binary decision criterium on the set of all nite-
dimensional vectors of real numbers is axiomatically characterized [2]. Here,
also an axiomatic comparison with the maximin decision criterium is oered.
An application of protective behaviour towards matching models is presented
in [3].
In this paper we want to proceed on this line of research by considering
protective behaviour in mixed extensions of nite games in strategic form.
First we dene both protective and prudent strategies in a strategic form
game based on the ideas of these two concepts in social choice situations. It
is shown that the sets of prudent and protective strategies for each player
in a strategic form game coincide. A protective strategy combination is
dened to be a strategy combination that consists of a protective strategy
for each player. Existence of protective strategy combinations is shown and
it is seen that each protective strategy is also a maximin strategy. So, in
particular, for matrix games, protective strategy combinations are equilibria
and oer a selection of the saddle points. Moreover, it is proved that each
protective strategy is a Dresher optimal strategy ([8]) and hence, for matrix
games, protective strategy combinations coincide with proper equilibria a la
Myerson ([13], cf. [7]), and the nucleolus introduced by [14] for matrix games.
For general strategic games, protective strategy combinations need not to
be Nash equilibria. For two-person games, however, the notion of protective
behaviour can be extended to provide selections of Nash equilibria, perfect
equilibria a la Selten [15] and proper equilibria. In the denition of this
extended concept of protective behaviour results on the structure of the set
of Nash equilibria [16], [10], perfect equilibria [6] and proper equilibria [11]
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are used.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the formal denition
of protective strategy combinations for nite strategic games. Existence is
shown and it is seen that protective strategies are minimax strategies. Section
3 concentrates on matrix games and it is shown that each protective strategy
combination is proper and conversely. Section 4 discusses a possible way to
use the concept of protective behaviour to obtain selections of Nash, perfect
and proper equilibria for bimatrix games. An example is presented to clarify
the main ideas.
2 Protective strategy combinations
Let N =f1; : : : ; ng denote the set of players. A nite game   in strategic
form with player set N is represented by   =hfSigi2N ; fKigi2Ni where for
each i 2 N , the nite set Si denotes the set of pure strategies for player i and
Ki :
Qn
j=1 Sj  ! IR denotes the payo function for player i.
Considering mixed strategies we let j = (Sj) represent the set of
all probability measures on Sj for all j 2 N . The payo functions fKigi2N
are extended to the set
Q
j2N j of all mixed strategies combinations in the
obvious way.














A pure strategy combination is denoted by s 2 S, a mixed strategy
combination by  2 . Sometimes, given i 2 N , we will write s = (s i; si)
and  = ( i; i).
A mixed strategy combination ~ is called a Nash equilibrium of   if for
each player i 2 N , Ki(~)  Ki(~ i; i) for all i 2 i. It is well known that
every nite game in strategic form has at least one combination of mixed
strategies which is a Nash equilibrium.











For each player i 2 N , the set i is compact and closed, and the payo-
function Ki is continuous. These properties guarantee the existence of max-
imin strategy combinations for every nite person game in strategic form.
As maximin strategies assure some payo to a player, we will see that
the notion of protectiveness and prudentness oers a possibility to select
interesting strategies out of this set. The notion of protective and prudent
domination is described below.
Denition 2.1 Let   =hfSigi2N ; fKigi2Ni. Let i 2 N and i 2 i. Recur-
sively, we dene ari (i) 2IR and S
r
 i(i)  S i by
(i) for r = 1,
a1i (i) = minfKi(s i; i)j s i 2 S ig
S1 i(i) = fs i 2 S ij Ki(s i; i) = a
1
i (i)g
(ii) for r > 1,




Sr i(i) = fs i 2 S ij Ki(s i; i) = a
r
i (i)g:
Denition 2.2 Let   be a nite game in strategic form. Let i 2 N and
i; ~i 2 i. We say that ~i dominates i in a protective way, in notation
~i pro i, if there exists an l 2IIN, such that
(i) ari (i) = a
r




 i(~i) for all r 2 IIN, r < l, and












A mixed strategy ̂i 2 i is called protective for player i in   if it is
undominated w.r.t. the protective dominance relation, i.e., if there does not
exist a mixed strategy ~i 2 i such that ~i pro ̂i.
A combination of mixed strategies  is called a protective strategy com-
bination of   if i is a protective strategy for player i for all i 2 N .
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So, a strategy is protective if it consecutivelymaximizes the worst possible
payo, thereby taking into account the sets of pure strategy combinations
of the opponents which yield that minimal amount. It turns out that each
protective strategy is maximin.
Lemma 2.1 Let   be an n person game in strategic form. If i is a protec-
tive strategy for player i in  , then i is also a maximin strategy for player
i in  .
Proof
Let   =hfSigi2N ; fKigi2Ni. Let i 2 N and let ̂i be a protective strategy
for player i. As a consequence of the denition 2.2, we have that
a1i (̂i) = min
s
 i2S i














and hence ̂i is a maximin strategy of player i.
However, the concepts of protective strategies and maximin strategies are
not equivalent as we can see in the following example.









The set of maximin strategies of the row player is given by
f(1(e1); 1(e2)) 2 1j
3
4
 1(e1)  1g
but only ̂1 with ̂1(e1) = 1 is protective.
Even though the protective dominance relation need not be complete,
the next lemma reveals that a protective strategy is dominant, up to payo
equivalence, with respect to the pro relation.
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Lemma 2.2 Let   =hfSigi2N ; fKigi2Ni. Let ~i 2 i be a protective strat-
egy of player i 2 N and let i 2 i be an arbitrary mixed strategy for player
i. Then, either ~i and i are payo equivalent for player i or ~i pro i.
Proof
Assume that ~i and i are not payo equivalent and suppose that ~i
does not dominate i in a protective way. Taking into account that ~i is a
protective strategy of player i, i does not dominate ~i in a protective way.
Then, according to denition 2.2, there exists l 2IIN such that
(i) ari (i) = a
r




 i(~i) for all r 2 IIN, r < l, and











Let 0 <  < 1 and let ̂i = ~i + (1   )i 2 i with the obvious interpre-
tation. We will prove that ̂i pro ~i.
Clearly, from (i), ari (i) = a
r
i (~i) = a
r
























i(~i). Consider the following two cases:
(a) Let Sl i(~i)
T







 i(~i). Then, there is an r > l such that ~s i 2 S
r
 i(i) and so,






Ki(~s i; ̂i) > Ki(~s i; ~i) = a
l
i(~i):
For all s i 2S
t
 i(~i) for some t > l, it holds that
Ki(s i; ~i) > a
l





and, hence, Ki(s i; ̂i) > a
l












ali(~i) = Ki(s i; ~i) = Ki(s i; ̂i) = Ki(s i; i) = a
l
i(i);
which implies that ali(̂i) = a
l
i(~i).










Ki(s i; ~i) > a
l
i(~i) or Ki(s i; i) > a
l














In both cases ̂i pro ~i. A contradiction results and the assertation of
the theorem holds.
Next we dene the prudent domination criterium. There is a slight dier-
ence between prudent and protective domination. Even though both criteria
compare payo levels, the former only compares , for each player, the cardi-
nality of the sets of pure strategy combinations of the opponents where those
payo levels are achieved instead of the inclusion relation used in the latter.
Denition 2.3 Let   =hfSigi2N ; fKigi2Ni. Let i 2 N and i; ~i 2 i. We
say that ~i dominates i in a prudent way, in notation ~i pru i, if there
exists l 2 IIN such that
(i) ari (i) = a
r




 i(~i)j for all r 2 IIN, r < l, and










A mixed strategy ̂i 2 i is called prudent for player i in   if it is undomi-
nated w.r.t. the prudent dominance relation, i.e., if there does not exist any
mixed strategy ~i 2 i such that ~i pru ̂i.
If a strategy of player i is prudent, then it is also protective because from
the denitions 2.2 and 2.3 it follows that ̂i pro i implies ̂i pru i. The
next example shows that the converse need not hold.




























S1 1(1) = fe2g and S
1
 1(~1) = fe1; e3g:
We may, however, conclude that 1 pru ~1. In this game there is only one






also the unique maximin strategy of the row player.
However, as a consequence of the lemma 2.2, the next theorem holds.
Theorem 2.1 In a nite strategic form game   a mixed strategy is protec-
tive if and only if it is prudent.
We use this equivalence between protective and prudent strategies to
prove the existence of protective strategy combinations in a nite game in
strategic form.
Theorem 2.2 Every nite game in strategic form has at least one protective
strategy combination.
Proof
We prove this result in a constructive way nding the set of prudent
strategies of a nite game in strategic form of an arbitrary player. Us-
ing theorem 2.1 we obtain also the set of all the protective strategies. Let
  =hfSigi2N ; fKigi2Ni. We dene for each i 2 N ,
M1i := f̂i 2 ij a
1
i (̂i) = maxfa
1
i (i)j i 2 igg






 i(i)j for all i 2M
1
i g
and for r > 1, we dene




i (̂i) = maxfa
r
i (i)j i 2M
r 1
i gg






 i(i)j for all i 2M
r
i g:
Note thatM1i is the set of maximin strategies of player i and that a
r
i (i) =1






Clearly,M ri 6=  and P
r





i; ̂i 2 P
r
i and r  1, and S i is a nite set, we can take the smallest t 2 IIN
such that P ti = P
r
i for all r  t.
By denition, P ti precisely contains all prudent strategies of player i in
the game  .
Since the protective strategy combinations (and therefore the prudent
ones) are maximin strategy combinations, the previous theorem and example
2.1 show that protective strategy combinations constitute a selection of the
maximin strategies for every nite game in strategic form.
3 Protective behaviour in matrix games
In this section we consider nite zero-sum gamesA = hS1; S2;Ki in strate-
gic form with the payo function K for player 1 determined by an m  n
matrix A in the following way
K(p; q) := pAq
for all p 2 1 and q 2 2. A matrix game will be denoted by A.
Dresher [8] proposed a criterion to select Nash equilibria of a matrix
game based on the assumption that each player follows a conservative plan of
action and tries to maximize the minimumgain resulting from the opponent's
deviations. For describing the Dresher procedure, we need some basic facts
of matrix games.
Let A = hS1; S2;Ki be an m  n matrix game where S1 = fe1; : : : ; emg










The sets of optimal strategies for player 1 and 2 are given by the polytopes
O1(A) := fp 2 1j pAfj  v(A) for all j 2 f1; : : : ; ngg
and
O2(A) := fq 2 2j eiAq  v(A) for all i 2 f1; : : : ;mgg:
9
Furthermore we dene the carrier of a strategy p 2 1 by
C1(p) := fei 2 f1; : : : ;mgj p(ei) > 0g;





and the equalizer set by
E1(A) := fei 2 f1; : : : ;mgj eiAq = v(A) for all q 2 O2(A)g:
The sets C2(q); C2(A) and E2(A) are dened in an analogous way. It is well
known that C1(A) = E1(A) and C2(A) = E2(A) (Bohnenblust, Karlin and
Shapley [4], Gale and Sherman [9]).
Dresher [8] constructs a sequence of matrix games Ak in the following
way. Let A1 = A. In the game A2 player 1 has as pure strategy set S1(2) the
extreme points of O1(A) and the set of pure strategies for player 2 is given
by S2(2) = S2 n C2(A). The payo functions in A
2 are just the restrictions
of the original ones.
If Ak 1 is dened and C2(A
k 1) 6= S2(k   1), then the set S1(k) of pure
strategies of player 1 in Ak is constituted by the extreme points of O1(A
k 1)
and the set S2(k) of pure strategies of player 2 is S2(k 1)nC2(A
k 1). Clearly,
after a nite number of steps t, At has been dened and C2(A
t) = S2(t). Then
O1(A
t) is called the set of D-optimal strategies of player 1 denoted by D1(A).
In a similar way, one denes the set D2(A) of D-optimal strategies of
player 2.
The set of proper equilibria of a matrix game was characterized in [7]
as the set of combinations of D-optimal strategies of the game. In [14] has
been proved that the nucleolus of a matrix game equals its set of proper
equilibria. We oer another characterization using the concept of protective
strategy combinations.
Theorem 3.1 For every nite matrix game the set of protective strategy
combinations coincides with the set of proper equilibria.
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Proof
Let A = hS1; S2;Ki be an m  n matrix game S1 = fe1; : : : ; emg and
S2 = ff1; : : : ; fng.
Let p be a protective strategy of player 1 in A. We will prove that p is
a D-optimal strategy. Using lemma 2.1, we know that p 2 O1(A). Assume
that p 2 O1(A
k) for all k 2 f1; : : : ; t   1g for some t  2 where Ak is as
described in the Dresher procedure. It suces to prove that p 2 O1(A
t) if
S2(t) = S2(t  1) n C2(A
t 1) 6= .
Let ~p 2 O1(A
t). If p and ~p are payo equivalent, the proof is nished.



















Suppose we have a strict inequality. Then, since p pro ~p there is a game




















 1(p). By denition, pAfs > ~pAfs and, hence,
fs 2 S2(t). For, suppose fs 62 S2(t). Then fs 2 C2(A
k) = E2(A
k) for some
k 2 f1; : : : ; t   1g and, consequently, since p 2 O1(A
k) and ~p 2 O1(A
k), it











and, there is equality. Hence, every protective strategy of player 1 is D-
optimal. We can proceed in an analogous way to prove that every protective
strategy of player 2 is also a D-optimal strategy.
Since each combination of D-optimal strategies is a proper equilibrium, it
follows that each protective strategy combination is also proper. Moreover,
since A has at least one protective strategy combination, this game has a
protective D-optimal combination of strategies. Taking into account that
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all D-optimal strategies are payo equivalent [7], it follows that all proper
equilibria of this game are protective.
4 Protective behaviour as a renement tool
for bimatrix games
A bimatrix game (A;B) is a two-person game   = hfS1; S2g; fK1;K2gi
in strategic form where S1 = fe1; : : : ; emg and S2 = ff1; : : : ; fng are the pure
strategy spaces for player 1 and 2, respectively and the payo functions are
given by
K1(p; q) := pAq and K2(p; q) := pBq (1)
for all p 2 1 and q 2 2, respectively.
Denition 4.1 Let (A;B) be an m  n bimatrix game. Let P  1 be a
non-empty, closed and convex set. Let p 2 P . We say that p is a protective
strategy for player i w.r.t. P if and only if there does not exist any p 2 P
such that p pro p.
In a similar way one denes a protective strategy of player 2 w.r.t a closed
and convex set Q  2.
The following game in extensive form illustrates the notion of protective
behavior with respect to a closed and convex subset of strategies.
Example 3.1.
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In each endpoint of the tree, the rst coordinate is the payo to player 1
and the second coordinate is the payo to player 2, if they reach this node
after a play. Its representation in reduced strategic form is given by the 24
bimatrix game (A;B), given by





(0; 6) (2; 0) (1=2; 4) (0; 8)
(0; 6) (0; 8) (1=2; 4) (1; 0)
!
We can obtain the set of Nash equilibria, perfect equilibria and proper
equilibria of this game using the GC-approach described in [5]. The set of
Nash equilibria and perfect equilibria of this game are the same and, using
the obvious notation, they are given by






g  f(1; 0; 0; 0)g:




); (1; 0; 0; 0)). If we use the
concept of protective strategy with respect to T 1 for player 1 and with respect




); (1; 0; 0; 0)).
Let us examine the dierences between them. A comparison between the
two should take into account the actions player 2 will take if the information
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set b is reached. Clearly, player 2 will never choose m if he is called upon




) leads to a
payo of 2
3
while the proper equilibrium strategy leads to either 1 (in case of
l) or 1
2
(in case of r). So the choice of the proper equilibrium seems riskier
for player 1 than the choice of the protective strategy.
For the protective dominance relation dened in 4.1, one can derive the
same type of results as we obtain in section 2 from the conditions that the set
P satises. So, for a protective strategy p 2 P and an arbitrary p 2 P either
p is payo equivalent with p or p pro p and consequently a strategy p 2 P
is protective w.r.t. P if and only if it is prudent w.r.t. P . Furthermore, each
nite game in strategic form has for every P at least one protective strategy
combination with respect to it. Given the fact that the set of Nash equilibria
of a bimatrix game [16], [10], the set of perfect equilibria of a bimatrix game
[6] and the set of proper equilibria of a bimatrix game [11] are the union
of a nite number of polytopes, we can select out Nash equilibria, perfect
equilibria and proper equilibria considering protective strategies with respect
to Nash, Selten and Myerson sets, respectively, for each player.
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